Introduction
"We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign State." With these words, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo proclaimed its 1 Jan Wouters is the Jean Monnet Chair and Full Professor of International Law and International Organizations and Director of the Leuven independence from Serbia. Soon thereafter, the United States, as well as a host of European Union (EU) Member States formally recognized the independence of Kosovo. However, its parent State and certain 2 other countries, such as Russia, Moldova or Romania, argued that the unilateral declaration of independence and Kosovo's subsequent secession from Serbia constituted a breach of international law. 3 Nevertheless, Kosovo's recognition by a majority of Western Powers sparked renewed hopes of independence for a number of de facto States. In this respect, Serbia's then president, Boris Tadić, stated that "there are dozens of other Kosovos in the world, and all of them are lying in wait for Kosovo's act of secession to become a reality and to be established as an acceptable norm." As time would show, he 4 was right.
Immediate responses were observed in the Caucasus, where the de facto presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced that they too would seek their independence before various international fora. While there was no prompt response, Russia formally recognized the independence of the two 5 break-away entities just a few months later. This was no surprise, as even before Kosovo's declaration of 6 independence, Vladimir Putin had warned that, " [i] f someone believes that Kosovo should be granted full independence as a state, then why should we deny it to the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians?" Similarly, 7 Igor Smirnov, the leader of Transnistria, indicated that Kosovo's impending recognition as a State exposed double standards: "[i]f this is a really fair, universal approach to conflict settlement, it must be applied also to Transnistria, and Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh." Nonetheless, the countries 8 that recognized Kosovo's independence have since argued that Kosovo is a 'unique' case that does not set a precedent for other separatist movements. 9 Is Kosovo indeed a one-off ? Obviously, the various situations in these territories are factually different. In this respect, they are all unique. However, de facto States contend that their cause for independent statehood is no less just as Kosovo's. In this respect, either implicitly or explicitly, they too claim a right to self-determination that includes secession as a remedy. So why is it then that the people 10 of Kosovo have attained independence, whereas the people of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, NagornoKarabakh, and Transnistria have not? The present contribution will explore this question by looking at how divergent practice has reshaped the contours of the present-day right to (external) self-determination and, thereby, extrapolate the current criteria or conditions that a people must meet to obtain independence. This will be done as follows: (I) first, the evolution of the right to (external) selfdetermination will be analysed through the lens of the self-determination v. sovereignty discourse; (II) second, an outline of the criteria or conditions that appear to facilitate (or obstruct) unilateral secession will be drawn; (III) third and final, we will endeavour to explain why, as opposed to other break-away territories, de facto States have been unable to achieve independent statehood. For example, Abkhazia's 1999 Declaration of Independence reads as follows: "we appeal to the UN, OSCE, and to all States of the world to 10 recognise the independent State created by the people of Abkhazia on the basis of the right of nations to free self-determination" (People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia, Act of Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia (12 October 1999) (S. Djindjolia), online: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization <http://www.unpo.org/>).
I.
The Self-Determination v. Sovereignty Conundrum Self-determination is probably one of the most-often invoked norms of international law. Surprisingly, it is also one of the most misunderstood, as it has been plagued by uncertainty and inconsistency from its very outset. The application of the right to self-determination in the post-Cold War era has been, at the very least, inconsistent. However, it is now generally accepted that this right is comprised by two distinct dimensions: internal and external self-determination. The internal aspect of self-determination refers to the right of 19 all peoples to "participate ... in the decision-making processes of the State," or that of ethnic, racial, or 20 religious minority groups "not to be oppressed by central government." This, it is often argued, is the 21 prevailing rule. For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada, in its opinion on the secession of Québec, 22 indicated that the right to self-determination is "normally fulfilled through internal self-determination-a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing [S] tate." Yet, there have been many instances where afflicted minority groups claimed a right to 23 unilaterally secede from their parent State. In this respect, some argue that the external dimension of selfdetermination is limited to colonial cases, while others contend that it also applies to subjugated As some have argued, "the defining issue in international law for the 21st century" is to find a compromise "between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of borders." In this respect, 27 the principle of State sovereignty, also known as the "backbone" of the Westphalian structure, aims to uphold the current parameters of the international system. One of the corollaries of State sovereignty is 28 the principle of territorial integrity, which acts as a guarantee against the dismemberment of a State's territory. International legal scholarship favours the idea that, outside the colonial context, "the right [to] Declaration provides that the right to self-determination shall not "be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States." Independent statehood, it seems, is not an 32 entitlement under international law. However, the Declaration also stipulates that only "States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" can rely 33 on the principle of territorial integrity. This formula insinuates that the right of States to territorial integrity is by no means unqualified. Actually, in accordance with the normative shift from "'sovereignty as authority' (control over territory)" to "'sovereignty as responsibility'", the principle of "territorial 34 integrity is in its turn limited by international law." Therefore, neither of the two principles is absolute. 35 36 Arguably then, under the correct set of circumstances, such an approach would leave the door open for unilateral secession. If, on the contrary, secession were absolutely excluded, the right to self-determination would be rendered illusory. 37 According to Marcelo Kohen, 'secession' refers to "the creation of a new independent entity through the separation of part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent of the latter." Obviously then, it is the lack of consent of the parent State that makes unilateral secession such a 38 problematic issue in international law. Indeed, when separation from the territorial State is a consensual process whereby the parent State recognizes the newly independent State, the international community will normally follow suit. When consent from both parties exists, the right to secede is not at all so it is argued, can be exercised as a "self-help [remedy]" in extreme situations. Therefore, as Antonio 55 Cassese mentioned, remedial secession is "the most radical form of external self-determination". 56 Dugard and Raič, two authors supporting the idea that international law allows for remedial secession in certain exceptional circumstances, argue that the application of this right can only be triggered when the following criteria are met: (i) first, the group invoking the right must be a 'people' with a distinct identity, "forming a numerical minority in relation to the rest of the population of the parent State", but constituting "a majority within a part of the territory of that State"; (ii) second, the parent State must have exposed said people to "serious grievances" amounting to massive violations of fundamental human rights of that people and/or a constant denial of the people's right to internal self-determination; (iii) third, "no (further) realistic and effective remedies for the peaceful settlement of the conflict" are left, since all negotiations between the people and the parent State have failed. However, we find that, when 57 measured against the practice of non-colonial State creations, these conditions appear, at best, insufficient. As a matter of fact, international practice has yet to provide even a single example whereby a break-away entity has emerged as a sovereign and independent State by simply fulfilling the foregoing criteria. Hence, to find the missing piece(s) of the puzzle, one must have a closer look at the practice of successful attempts at unilateral secession.
The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign State and, more recently, the unilateral secession of Kosovo, are generally cited as examples supportive of the remedial secession doctrine. To a greater or 58 lesser extent, both Bangladesh and Kosovo had exhibited the cumulative conditions described above before their leap for independence. Bangladesh, for instance, proclaimed its independence in 1971, followed by a period of martial rule that "involved acts of repression and even possibly genocide and caused some ten million Bengalis to seek refuge in India." Twenty-eight States, including India, 59 immediately recognized Bangladesh. While the unilateral secession of Bangladesh may well have ended 60 oppression, it also remains true that universal recognition only followed in 1974, after Pakistan formally recognized its former province. Since it was the consent of the parent State that, in the end, led to the 61 formal recognition of Bangladesh, it can be assumed that secession was not yet perceived as a prerogative under international law. 62 Kosovo's independence follows a similar pattern. Indeed, while the proclamations included in the Declaration of Independence may, at times, resemble remedial secession arguments, it is difficult to 63 understand how unilateral secession in 2008, after Kosovo had been governed independently from Serbia for almost nine years, could end any oppression. If remedial secession is indeed a last resort remedy, Kosovo should have declared independence as early as 1999, at the very height of its oppression. The 64 conditions relating to human rights abuses and/or denial of internal selfdetermination, the fulfilment of which may trigger unilateral secession, were simply no longer in place at the time of the Declaration of Independence. Nonetheless, Kosovo has since been embraced as an independent State by a considerable 65 part of the international community. What this suggests, we argue, is that the doctrine of remedial secession cannot, in and by itself, determine the legitimacy of secessionist claims. See Christian Tomuschat, "Secession and Self-Determination" in Kohen, supra note 38, 23 at 42. 58 Crawford, supra note 45 at 141.
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The document made reference to "years of strife and violence in Kosovo, that disturbed the conscience of all civilised people" and declared 63 Kosovo to be "a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law" (Kosovo Declaration of Independence, supra note 1); See also Vidmar, supra note 30 at 48-49.
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In the case concerning the secession of Québec, the Supreme Court of Canada held that "[t]he ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition." A 66 favourable outcome to an attempt at nonconsensual secession, it seems, is highly dependent on international recognition. Arguably, when oppressed people invoke the right to remedial secession, the international community may be more willing to ignore the territorial integrity of the parent State and bestow recognition upon the secessionist entity. Whether a legal entitlement or not, it appears that the 67 doctrine of remedial secession provides political and normative legitimacy to aggrieved secessionist groups and, as a result, may encourage other States to recognize their independence. For instance, the majority of the countries that recognized Kosovo as an independent state invoked the elements of remedial secession to explain their reaction. Unilateral secession, it seems, can only become effective 68 through widespread international recognition. While this argument could be seen as problematic in view of the general understanding in contemporary international law that recognition is a declaratory and not a constitutive act, it also remains true that, in cases concerning entities with ambiguous status, recognition is important as it attaches certain rights and duties to the entity in question, facilitates its relationship with other States, brings about legal capacity, and potentially full membership in international organizations. 69 Arguably then, extensive international recognition will turn independence into an irreversible option. 70 Alternatively (or possibly even cumulatively), international involvement in the form of a UN international administration mission would, in all likelihood, facilitate a break-away entity's attempt at unilateral secession. While the international community has rarely intervened to assist peoples in the 71 realization of their secessionist claims, it also remains true that, in those few cases where the level and form of such intervention was significant, independent statehood almost always followed. Illustrative in 72 this respect are the examples of East Timor and Kosovo.
The East Timorese struggled for independence from Indonesia for several decades. However, it was not until the UN Security Council established a peacekeeping mission and, immediately thereafter, a transitional administration mission (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor), that East Timor finally became a sovereign and independent State. Despite the exceptionality argument, the 73 74 almost unprecedented UN involvement in Kosovo has further contributed to the crystallization of this practice. For instance, in his Report on Kosovo's future status, Martti Ahtisaari indicated that prolonged and significant involvement by the international community could potentially justify a move away from the UN's defence of the territorial integrity of its Member States. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo
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(UNMIK), he further contended, had created an "irreversible" situation whereby Serbia had ceased to exercise "any governing authority over Kosovo." The establishment of UNMIK, as well as the gradual 76 loss of Serbia's sway over Kosovo had generated "an unstoppable momentum" toward independent statehood. Arguably then, some form of international involvement in self-determination seeking regions 77 may ultimately determine the success or failure of a claim to independence.
The above, we believe, illustrates the remaining criteria for unilateral secession. To us, the practice of successful non-consensual secessions indicates that the conditions currently underlying the theory of remedial secession cannot, by themselves, secure independent statehood. Widespread international recognition and/or significant UN involvement are needed in addition. Otherwise, an entity that claims independence from its parent State, whether justified or not under the rules of remedial secession, will, most likely, fail to attain de jure statehood. This, some argue, is the story of de facto States.
III.
De Facto States: Victims or Pariahs?
De facto States are "territories that have gained de facto independence," but no international recognition or support. Break-away entities such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or 78 Transnistria uphold, to the exclusion of the central government, effective control over the territories they lay claim on, but for one reason or another, have failed to secure sovereign and independent statehood. 79 Instead, although they also claim a right to remedial secession, de facto States are forced to languish at the fringes of an international community that views them as nothing more than pariahs that have violated the principle of territorial integrity. Whether accepted or not, claims for independence are invariably 80 made on the basis of the right to self-determination, which, in the words of Marc Weller, "encapsulates the hopes of ethnic peoples and other groups for freedom and independence." On this matter, some 81 legal scholars contend that de facto States are victims of circumstance: their claims for remedial independence unjustifiably rebuffed by the international community and their quest for sovereign statehood unreasonably hindered by the exceptionality discourse put forward with respect to some of their counterparts. However, it is submitted here that this could not be further from the truth. Indeed, it 82 is painfully obvious that these territories fail to fulfil most, if not all, the criteria or conditions for unilateral secession. In this respect, Dugard and Raič assert that an attempt at unilateral secession in the absence of these criteria could very well constitute an "abuse of right" and a "violation of the law of selfdetermination." Additionally, if the criteria for unilateral or remedial secession are not met, and a de 83 facto State is nonetheless created in violation of the law of self-determination, the international community will most likely withhold recognition. The very existence of these statelets, we argue, 84 supports this proposition.
The reason why these territories have failed to attain independent statehood is simple: the underlying criteria for unilateral secession are not met. Take, for instance, the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia where, prior to the outbreak of any secessionist struggle, it is possible that individuals of Abkhazian and South Ossetian origin did not constitute a clear majority of the population in the areas they claimed as their own. When a people do not constitute a majority of the population inhabiting the territory that it 85 claims, independent statehood becomes an almost unattainable goal. The absence of serious human 86 rights violations by Georgia is also relevant here. In this respect, the request by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an official investigation into the situation in Georgia casts further doubts on South Ossetia's remedial secession claims. More precisely, the Prosecutor of the ICC 87 has found that there is a "reasonable basis" to believe that "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" have been committed in the context of the five-day war that Georgia and Russia fought over South Ossetia in 2008. Some of the alleged crimes, it seems, were committed as part of a campaign to expel 88 ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia, whereby Georgian civilians were killed in a forcible displacement campaign operated by the South Ossetian de facto authorities. This, coupled with the "intransigence [of 89 Abkhazia and South Ossetia] at the negotiating table", further explains their failure to attain independence. 90 On this point, the UN Security Council has long bemoaned the lack of progress in the area of status negotiations, indicating, for instance, that "a comprehensive political settlement, which must include a settlement of the political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia" should be achieved. In 91 Nagorno-Karabakh too, there is no solid basis for unilateral secession since the Armenian majority has not been exposed to egregious human rights violations or flagrant denials of the right to internal selfdetermination. In the situations described here, secession does not appear as a good faith attempt to 92 redress severe injustice. Transnistria, Borgen contends, is no different. It also fails to meet any of the 93 conditions for external self-determination, as there is no distinct Transnistrian people, no massive violations of human rights by Moldova, and other options short of unilateral secession are readily available to the leaders of the Transnistrian enclave. The claims for remedial secession that de facto 94 States have put forward are therefore nothing more than mere rhetoric. Their leaders have realized that arguments for independence based solely on the idea of national selfdetermination always lose out against the principle of State sovereignty. As a consequence, these aspiring States have adapted their discourse by adding remedial secession arguments. Unfortunately for them, such arguments are unsubstantiated by
